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MEDICAID EXPANSION AND THE U.S. SECULAR BOOM:  
THE CROWDING OUT OF RELIGION’S SOCIAL INSURANCE FUNCTION 
BY 
SAMUEL HAMMOND 




Since 1990 the share of the U.S. population claiming no religion has more 
than doubled. This paper analyzes the causes of this “secular boom” using 
the conception of religious organizations as informal insurance providers. 
Applying panel estimation techniques to data from the General Social 
Survey and Religious Congregations & Membership Study, my results 
consistently demonstrate that the growth in the non-religious population was 
caused by the massive expansion of public assistance medical benefits, 
principally Medicaid, in the early 90’s. Transmission mechanisms are 
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I. Introduction  
 
The last two decades have seen a sweeping change in the American religious landscape. 
Since at least the early 1990s, both religious affiliation and metrics of involvement in 
religion such as the frequency of church attendance have shown significant, historically 
unprecedented declines across all fifty states (Pew, 2008; Gallup, 2014; Kosmin, & 
Keysar, 2009). Christianity, in particular, which once constituted over 90 percent of the 
American public, now appears to be in relative decline from its status as the religion of 
the overwhelming majority, with considerable losses among both Catholic and Protestant 
congregations (Pew, 2008). Simultaneously, the population of so-called “Nones” or 
“Nips” (believing in “nothing in particular”) has grown dramatically, nearly doubling 
their share of the American population with the expectation of continued growth. 
Researchers have dubbed this phenomenon the “secular boom” (Kosmin & Keysar, 
2008).  
In this paper, I propose and verify the accuracy of a particularly compelling 
explanation, rooted in past theoretical models. I hypothesize that the U.S. secular boom 
can be linked to the dramatic expansion of public health assistance benefits such as 
Medicaid, beginning in the late 1980s. I conceptualize my model by viewing religious 
organizations as providers of social insurance and intermediaries for risk pooling, for the 
benefit of committed members (Franck & Iannaccone, 2009; Chen, 2010; Clark & Lelkes, 
2006). My direction of research is closest in spirit to Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) which 




is believed to be the first to test the link between aggregate welfare spending and 
measures of religiosity.  
The two main data sources I will use on religion are the General Social Survey 
(GSS) and the decadal church membership data compiled in the Religious Congregations 
& Membership Study (RCMS). Among my results is the finding that a $100 increase in 
per-capita Medicaid spending is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the 
population share of the non-religious. My objective being the measurement of the impact 
of the state subsidized healthcare on measures of religious preference, I use panel-data 
techniques on a model tested for robustness to alternative specifications.  
The paper begins with a review of the existing literature. The past research 
reviewed, with a focus on “rational choice” or “social exchange” theories about religious 
markets, helps to determine the exact nature of the religious commodity. This is followed 
by an empirical section where my results are reported. I conclude with a discussion of the 
findings and suggestions for further research.  
II. Literature Overview 
II.a. Religion and Market Structure 
 
Adam Smith introduced the economics of religion in a chapter of The Wealth of Nations 
(Smith, 1981, Book V, Chapter I). Focusing on market structure, he emphasized the 
unintended consequences of a state monopoly on religion. He argued that religiosity 
suffers under state monopoly relative to the nations with deregulated religion markets, 




wherein a plurality of religious institutions engages in monopolistic competition seeking 
to have a larger market share through recruiting adherents (Iannaccone, 1996; Ekelund et 
al., 2005). Subsequent empirical research has provided evidence for Smith’s insight, 
finding that government regulation and monopolization of the religion market leads to 
lower rates of religious belief and church attendance (see: Iannaccone, 1996; Cojoc, 2010; 
North & Gwin, 2004, Finke & Stark, 1992).  
The generality of these results has been contested, though the disagreement in the 
literature has focused on the validity of various indices of religious pluralism as accurate 
proxies for religious “competition” (see: Finke & Stark, 1988; Chaves and Gorski, 2001; 
and Voas, Olson & Crockett, 2002). Separate from this specific debate, religious 
deregulation per se still appears to lead to increased levels of religious participation, 
quantified through conventional measures (Olav, et al., 2010; North & Staha, 2004). This 
fact helps to explain the high historical religiosity of the United States, which 
constitutionally separated church and state, compared to Western Europe where 
monarchy and state religion went hand in hand (Finke & Stark, 1992).  
II.b. Religious Organization 
 
Economists since Smith have gone further to consider the internal organisational structure 
of religious institutions as sources of their success.  In this vein, the work of Lawrence 
Iannaccone (1992) was seminal. He modeled religious organizations as clubs in the 
business of supplying local public goods with positive returns to increased participation. 
Since religious institutions are mainly funded through voluntary donations or customs 




such as tithing, like many other types of clubs they may encounter the problem of free-
riding as the congregation grows. Seemingly unproductive and even bizarre practices and 
rituals, from stigmas to self-sacrifice, Iannaccone (1992 & 1994) argued, could thus have 
“rationally” emerged as a solution to “screen out” people with low willingness to 
contribute to  religious groups’ activities (see also: Henrish, 2009; Aimone et al., 2010).  
A key prediction of this model is that stricter religious organizations will be able 
to better screen out free-riders and therefore be more successful in terms of longevity and 
popularity. Iannaccone’s influential “Why Strict Churches Are Strong” (1994) argued that 
the distinctiveness of a religious denomination was a better predictor of religious 
participation than any standard individual-level variable like age, education, region or 
marital status (Iannaccone, 1994: 1200). Olson and Perl (2001) and (2005:123) provided 
further evidence that high demands on congregants serve to limit free- and cheap-riding 
members, and generate increased contributions (See also: Scheitle & Finke 2008:815).  
II.c. The Religion Commodity 
 
Whereas Iannaccone’s earlier work left the exact nature of the religious commodity 
relatively ambiguous, Stark and Bainbridge (1987: 46)  interestingly distinguish between 
two potential types of benefits: “Rewards” and “Compensators”. Rewards are any 
material returns that humans are willing to incur a cost to obtain, from participatory 
activities like church choir, to the status conferred in being an active church member. 
Compensators, on the other hand, are a postulated set of nontemporal rewards, such as 




answers to existential questions, or the divine guidance derived from prayer, which 
reduce or eliminate existing costs.  
Compensators allow many of the seemingly unproductive doctrines and rituals of 
a religion to exist because followers genuinely perceive theological truth. Conversely, 
rational choice transforms sacrosanct doctrines and symbols into a superficial kind of 
product differentiation or commitment signalling mechanism. In Iannaccone’s own 
words:   
“Mormons abstain from caffeine and alcohol, Seventh Day Adventists avoid 
eating meat, Krishnas shave their heads, wear robes, and chant in public, Moonies 
submit to arranged marriages, Jehovah's Witnesses refuse transfusions, Orthodox 
Jews wear side curls and yarmulkes, conduct no business on the Sabbath, and 
observe numerous dietary restrictions, and monks take vows of celibacy, poverty, 
and silence. These practices are problematic, not only because they deviate from 
"normal” behavior, but also because they appear completely counterproductive.” 
(Iannaccone, 1994: 1182) 
From the point of view of the religious, things seem different: The practices are not only 
considered productive – they may represent the only behaviour-set conducive to eternal 
salvation. Azzi and Enrenberg (1975), for example, model believers as investing in 
religious organizations in order to receive benefits in the afterlife. While religions often 
promise rewards for certain behaviours in the afterlife, this does not help explain religious 
group formation. Versions of Hinduism and Buddhism, for example, give promises of an 




afterlife with greater emphasis on personal behavior over organizational affiliation, and 
therefore deal in rewards and compensators with more non-exclusivity relative to 
Christianity (Stark and Bainbridge, 1987:36). Not all of the benefits of religions can be 
qualified as “intangible” or incomparable with commodities exchanged in the markets 
against money.  
Consistent with a Iannccone-type “commitment signalling for club goods” model 
is the view that the primary commodity being provided by religious organizations is a 
form of mutual aid or social insurance through heightened solidarity among members 
(Franck & Iannaccone, 2009; Berman 2000; Berman & Laitin, 2008; Chen, 2010; 
Scotchmer, 2002). This brings to the fore a relevant stylized fact: the prima facie positive 
correlation between secularism and state welfare spending. Among advanced economies, 
the Scandinavian countries are possibly among the least religious nations on earth while 
also having some of the most comprehensive social democratic welfare states. The United 
States, in contrast, is perhaps the most religious advanced economy, and one of the most 
laissez-faire regarding welfare spending. Cross-national studies show this to be much 
more than a spurious correlation (Gill & Lundsgaarde, 2004; Franck & Iannaccone, 
2009).  Gill (2004), which claims to be the first study to directly test welfare spending 
aggregates against religiosity, declares  “there is likely to be a substitution effect for some 
individuals between state-provided services and religious services” (Gill & Lundsgaarde, 
2004. page 425) 
 




II.d. Religion as Insurance 
 
Work by Daniel Hungerman provides strong evidence of substitution between state social 
insurance and religious services. His recent work (2009) using data from the United 
Methodist Church found that a $1 increase in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
spending crowded out 30 cents of per-member charitable church spending in a county of 
average racial diversity, with the effect increasing as diversity decreases. A similar study 
by Hungerman (2005) of charitable giving in the Presbyterian Church found a similar 
crowding out effect, using the 1996 welfare reform as an instrument. Interestingly, the 
study was able to control for a range of church membership sizes and found steadily 
larger negative coefficients with respect to per-capita welfare spending as church size 
increased (See also: Gruber, 2004).  
Studies have found evidence of the insurance function of religion in a variety of 
distinctive ways. Clark and Orsolya (2006) find substantial evidence of the insurance 
function using life satisfaction surveys and job replacement rates, concluding that religion 
helps buffer against “psychic” harms of unemployment as well as the material ones. 
Dehejia et. al (2007) find contributors to religious organizations are proportionately 
insured against income shocks. Chen (2010) finds a similar role in enabling consumption 
smoothing. Research done by health professionals have also shown the role played by 
religion in self-care and coping with illness and physical pain (see: Coleman & Holzemer, 
1999; Colman, 2003; Coleman, 2004; Chou, 2004; Coleman et al., 2006). 




The function of religion as a coping mechanism, i.e. internal insurance, helps 
make sense of the substantial body of studies showing a connection between religious 
participation and a wide range of health outcomes. The literature considers both physical 
and psychic harms, from reduced morbidity (See: Levin et al, 1996; Aaron, et al, 2003; 
Van Olphen, 2003) to the finding that the subjective well-being of religious participants 
increases with a religion’s conservatism/strictness (Ellison, 1991). This has lead medical 
researchers such as Levin (1989) to propose an epidemiology of religion. In 
epidemiological terms, religious participation seem to imbue protective factors (Ellison & 
Levin, 1998), or conditions which help communities or individuals effectively cope 
against stressful events and mitigate risk. This social support function of religious 
organizations appears to work both formally through direct outreach programs (Ellison & 
Levin, 1998:703) and informally through social-integration and information 
dissemination of best health practices (Levin, 2009). 
By construction, insurance functions as means of consumption smoothing and 
hence it presuppose the presence of risk. Miller and Hoffman (1995) were among the first 
to explicitly suggest a correlation between religiosity and high risk aversion.  They 
convincingly show that gender differences in religiosity can be parsimoniously explained 
by the differing risk preferences of men and women. This may help explain the male bent 
in the demographics of the contemporary American non-religious. The risk-preference 
hypothesis remains controversial within sociology, but the empirical evidence continues 
to pile up. Miller (2000) finds strong support for the risk preference hypothesis on a cross 
national level. Liu (2010), in a study of religious participation in Taiwan, shows a 




statistically significant relationship between risk preference and religious participation, 
but not affiliation. Jiang et. al. (2013) discovered that religious family firms in China are 
more risk averse than nonreligious family firms, as manifested in lower levels of 
leverage, fixed asset and R&D investments. Lastly, in a panel study on the determinants 
of individual risk attitudes, Bartke and Schwarze (2008) find religiosity is significantly 
associated with lower risk tolerance, and that risk aversion strengthens with the strictness 
of the religion, even across nations. Atheists in contrast were the most risk-tolerant. 
Research in the development economics literature on the relationship between risk 
pooling and group formation provides a plausible model of religious group formation that 
goes beyond a generic club perspective. Indeed, models of self-enforcing risk-sharing 
agreements from Coate and Ravallion (1993) to Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002), 
imply many of the properties of religious clubs described by Iannaccone, but in what I 
believe to be a more unifying and coherent way. Take the two phenomena Iannaccone 
(1992) placed most emphasis on: stigma and sacrifice. On stigma, ostracism due to 
noncompliance falls straight out of self-enforcing insurance arrangements. On sacrifice, 
note that the voluntary risk-sharing literature was partially kicked-off by the insight that 
such arrangements could emerge through reciprocal altruism via gift exchange (Posner 
1980; Arrow 1976). That is, stigma and sacrifice are specifically predicted by informal 
insurance models, as opposed to being a couple hypothetical solutions to an enforcement 
problem among many. 




The club model, in contrast, simply requires any generic cost or benefit to correct 
behaviour in light of a participation externality. For example, Iannaccone, collaborating 
with Aimone et al. (2010), have tested endogenous group formation via unproductive 
costs in a laboratory experiment. Their results support the conclusion that “sacrifice” is an 
effective mechanism for engendering cooperation and improving voluntary contributions 
in a public goods game. But it is not clear how a religious club discovers sacrifice 
specifically, as opposed to other potential unproductive costs. Further, they do not 
explicitly test or model risk aversion, despite it being a detectable source of heterogeneity 
in their data (2010: 34).  
An informal insurance model is also more conducive to the study of the U.S. 
secular boom as I have conceived it, for it provides clear parameters for self-enforcing 
insurance arrangements to lose relevance and collapse. For example, in the model 
presented in Genicot & Ray (2004) with stationary transfer payments, individuals are 
always updating whether to continue in the insurance arrangement based on the 
realization of the most recent income shock. If something exogenous reduces the 
probability of a severe income shock (like a state run social safety net) it is very easy for 
autarky to become dominant and thus for the informal arrangements to disintegrate. 
Moreover, informal insurance models often emphasize incentive compatibility over 
constraints that merely induce participation (Genicot & Ray, 2004:10). This is useful for 
explaining how religions can elicit greater seriousness of purpose that extends beyond 
being in attendance. High degrees of risk aversion relax the enforcement constraint, and 
vice versa. Genicot & Ray’s model also allows for the stable sub-groups to form, 




potentially but not necessarily destabilizing the larger group. This has clear analogues in 
the study of religious schisms.  
The picture that is emerging from the preceding literature review all strongly 
supports the view of religious organizations as informal insurance arrangements that 
harness the social-cohesive powers of religious beliefs and practices to address limited 
commitment (f. ex. Aimone et al, 2010). The insurance benefits of religion are incentive 
compatible and positively related to individual contribution and participation. These 
benefits are particularly strong when health and income shock are faced by the individual 
(f. ex. Ellison & Levin, 1998), and show potential to be crowded out by state provided 
substitutes (f. ex. Hungerman, 2009). Finally, the cross-coutry evidence suggests that 
state welfare spending may ultimately impact religiosity and even affiliation (f. ex. Gill & 
Lundsgaarde, 2004). My next step will be to review some preliminary evidence of the 
above dynamics at work in the contemporary U.S. 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.a. Preliminary Evidence 
 
The U.S. Census is prohibited by law from asking a question on religious affiliation on a 
mandatory basis, and has not systematically collected information on religion since 
1936.
1
 Instead there are a series of private voluntary surveys, including regular surveying 
by the likes of Gallup and Pew. Gallup collects annual state level data, ideal for a panel 
                                                          
1
 US Censes Bureau (2010), “Does the Census Bureau have data for religion?” US Censes Bureau: 
Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved from https://ask.census.gov/faq.php?id=5000&faqId=29 




analysis; however, this paper primarily draws on the General Social Surveys (GSS) and 
the Religious Congregations & Membership Study (RCMS). This is mainly due to the 
proprietary nature of Gallup’s annual state surveys. 
 Gallup’s 2012 survey ranking state religiosity is publically available, however, 
and gives some stylized support to the notion that state social insurance is correlated with 
secularism in the U.S.. In the same way that cross national panel studies were motivated 
by the observed increased in secularism of European social-democracies relative to the 
laissez-faire religiosity of the U.S. republic (Gill & Lundsgaarde, 2004), a similar 
observation is possible of the internal U.S. religious landscape. The most religious states 
in the union tend to be in the American South, where poverty rates tend to be higher, and 
state social spending tends to be lower compared to the more secular North East. 
According to Gallup in 2013, Mississippi was the most religious state, while Vermont 
was the least. Incidentally, 2011 saw passage of Vermont’s Green Mountain Care act, 
establishing Vermont as the first state to create a single-payer health care system.
2
  
 In 2013, the libertarian CATO institute came out with their “Work versus Welfare 
Trade-off” report (Tanner, M. & Hughes, C., 2013), which estimates the total welfare 
benefits available by state from a set of the seven largest social programs. It ranks 
Mississippi as the least generous state for welfare, while Vermont ranks 8
th
 among the 
most generous. Indeed, comparing the top and bottom 15 states in both rankings, the 
expected pattern holds. Of the fifteen least generous states for welfare according to 
                                                          
2
 Davenport, M.  (2011), “Vt. Senate approves single-payer plan.” WCAX News. Retrieved from: 
http://www.wcax.com/story/14518224/vt-senate-approves-single-payer-plan 




CATO, 9 are also ranked within the fifteen most religious states according to Gallup. 
Comparing the state ranks on a scatter diagram, a striking negative relationship emerges 
(See: Figure 1).  
 
This is of course only suggestive and does nothing to control for other factors that could 
be driving the correlation. A clue may be the largest benefits shaping CATO’s ranking in 
dollar terms, Housing followed by Medicaid. However, 17 states lack any state housing 
program whatsoever.  Thus to dig deeper into this correlation I will turn to my first main 
religious data source, with a focus on public medical assistance programs. 
III.b. Religious Congregations & Membership Study (RCMS) 
 
The RCMS is a decadal census that provides a county level enumeration of 
congregations, adherents and congregational members by religious denomination. The 
voluntary census was conducted in 1952, 1971, 1980 and every ten years thereafter. 












































Religiosity Rank, 1 = Largest "Very Religious" Population 
Gallup (2012) 
Figure 1. Welfare vs Religiosity 




Different years have different slightly different response rates and sampling 
procedures, therefore there are potentially comparison issues between the surveys due to 
selection bias effects.  Before 1980, for example, the survey was exclusively of churches 
and thus ignored synagogues and congregations of other non-Christian faiths. Using the 
county level also potentially introduces a lot of noise into the sample, with some counties 
having more purported adherents than their resident population. A choice couple 
sentences from the 1990 survey documentation summarizes the data issues succinctly: 
“This data set contains statistics by state for 133 Judeo-Christian church bodies, providing 
information on the number of churches and members. It is not known exactly what 
percent of total Judeo-Christian adherents this actually represents.”  
 
There is no discernible long run trend in the RMCS data (Figure 2); however the sudden 
12 point decline in the 2010 mean is notable, along with the relative dearth at the top of 
the distribution. The 2000 and 2010 surveys were both conducted by the Association of 
Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, and are very reliable sets for within state 







1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Figure 2. Church Adherents per 100 by State (RMCS)  




religious” respondents by state, as opposed to their moderate or non-religious 
respondents, which makes some sense: More deeply religious individuals ought to be 
more easily identifiable as adherents to a particular congregation. 
To investigate the relationship between adherents and state medical spending I 
used the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) data on personal transfer receipts to 
calculate real per-capita medical benefits by state. Medical benefit transfer receipts are 
composed of three parts: Federal Medicare payments to intermediaries; Public assistance 
medical care for low income individuals, such as Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP); and military medical insurance benefits, for dependent active 
and retired military personnel.  
Of these three components, Medicaid and Medicare are the most significant in 
dollar terms. Medicare is delivered to people 65 years and older, people with long term 
kidney disease, and people who are disabled and cannot work. Medicaid in contrast was 
specifically created for low income individuals, children under 19, and pregnant women; 
in fact, three quarters of recipients are children and their parents.
3
 Seniors and the 
disabled can be eligible for both. Today, with over 60 million enrollees, Medicaid is the 
larger of the two programs (around 44 million are covered under Medicare), and on an 
expenditure per-capita basis has grown significant faster than Medicare.
4
 This is 
                                                          
3
 Galewitz, P (2009), “Test your knowledge of Medicaid: True or False?” Kaiser Health News. Retrieved 
from: http://mylocalhealthguide.com/2009/07/02/test-your-knowledge-of-medicaid-true-or-false/  
4
 Graham, J. (2010), “Medicaid Spending Growth is Unrelated to Recession.” National Center for Policy 
Analysis. Retrieved from: http://healthblog.ncpa.org/medicaid-spending-growth-is-unrelated-to-recession/ 




important to keep in mind in comparing the growth in per-capita medical benefits across 
decades. 
Figure 3 plots the ten-year change in real per-capita medical spending on the 
vertical axis for the stated decade. On every graph, the horizontal axis shows the change 
in adherents between 2000 and 2010. The graphs show that the states that had the large 
2000-2010 decline in adherents also tended to have the greatest increases in per-capita 
medical benefits in very decade going back to 1970-80.   
Figure 4 plots the medical benefit changes against the adherent changes of the 
same decade. The image that emerges is what I refer to as the “adherents shock.”  At first, 
increasing medical spending was weakly associated with growing numbers of adherents, 
with the trend reversing in the 1990s, followed by a sudden loss in adherents in the 2000s.   
 




Figure 3. Increasing Medical Benefits Foreshadowed Adherents Decline
 





Putting the data into a fixed effects model with robust standard errors gives a baseline 
estimate of the effect size. The dependent variable is the change in adherents per 100; the 
independent variable is the change in medical benefits, by state and decade; αi is a fixed 
intercept; uit is the error term. 
Δ Adherentsit  =  β0 + β1Δ Medical Benefitsit + αi + uit 
Table 1. Dependent Variable: Δ Adherents; N=200, 50x4 
 
Coefficient Std. Err.* p-value 95% Conf. Interval 
Δ Medical Benefits  -0.01218 0.001278 0.000 -0.01475 -0.00961 
Constant 7.189806 0.838719 0.000 5.5044 8.8753 
R-squared within  = 0.2906    *robust 
 
between = 0.0066 



















































Decadal Change in Adherents per 100 









Based on these 200 observations (50 groups, 4 periods), adherents declined by 1.2 people 
out of every hundred for every $100 decadal increase in per-capita medical spending. 
That is, in states where medical spending increased $1000 on average, they could expect a 
12 person per 100 decline in adherents.  
III.b.i Empirical Model using RCMS data 
 
Fixed effects models are sometimes described as a blunderbuss approach to avoiding 
heterogeneity bias, as it works by treating all omitted variables as time invariant. This is a 
strong assumption, so in this section I will elaborate on the baseline model with a set of 
controls that may plausibly influence rates of adherents or medical spending: 
Table 2. Variable descriptions, for decades 1980-2010 
Variable Description Source Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
       
Adherents See above RCMS 53.41 12.78 27.63 84.86 
Medical See above BEA.gov 1539.54 956.06 284.83 4531.44 
∆ Adherents   -0.803 8.05 -24.50 15.99 
∆ Medical   656.25 368.12 126.80 1727.13 
ln(Median 
Income) 
Wealth control U.S. Census  10.80 0.16 10.45 11.19 
Median Age Demographic control U.S. Census  35.91 2.35 26.65 42.23 
Highschool 
Grad Rate 
Education control U.S. Census 10.85 7.81 55.8 91.4 
Poverty Annual poverty rate 
based on income 
thresholds 
U.S. Census  12.49 3.58 4.5 25.3 
Diversity The probability that 
any two randomly 
chosen individuals 
are of a different race 
ESRI.com 42.01 18.20 6.8 81.5 




Table 3. Dependent Variable = ∆ Adherents (RCMS)* 
N=200, 4x50  
1980-2010 
Fixed Effects 
∆ Medical -0.0182 
 









































  R-Squared Within 0.5491 0.6910 
Between 0.2136 0.0000 
Total 0.0771 0.2021 
* Note coefficients significant at the 10 percent level or better have been bolded. 
 
Even with the introduction of these standard controls, both the change in per-capita 
medical benefits and the level of per-capita medical benefits have a highly significant 
impact. A Hausman test of the model rejects the null for a random-effects estimation. The 




sign and magnitude of the coefficients for the medical variables were not sensitive to 
alternative specifications, including replacing ∆Adherents with the Adherents level 
variable. 
 The signs on the significant control variables are all as I expected. While one 
might expect median income to be negatively associated with adherents change, 
remember that fixed effects pull out within group variation. Median income in this data 
set is strongly negatively related to adherents rates when cross sectional regressions are 
employed. In this case, higher state median incomes were positively correlated with the 
change in adherents simply because they had fewer adherents to lose. The same point 
applies to median age. Higher poverty rate were expected to be negatively correlated to 
the dependent variable for the same reason as medical spending: greater poverty implies 
greater medical benefit eligibility. Finally, that racial diversity was positive comports 
with the findings from Hungerman (2009). 
III.b.ii Discussion of Results from RCMS 
 
To help interpret these results it is necessary to digress briefly on the history of the 
hospital care in the United States. In the early 19
th
 century, most of American medical 
care was done at home, including surgeries
5
. If you were poor, sick or infirm, the only 
rudimentary aid available came through almshouses managed by the local community, 
often out of religiously motivated charity. Following the Civil War, industrializing and 
                                                          
5
 America’s Essential Hospitals (2013). “History of Public Hospitals in the United States,” Retrieved from: 
http://essentialhospitals.org/about-americas-essential-hospitals/history-of-public-hospitals-in-the-united-
states/ 




the development of large cities coincided with a greater demand for public hospital care. 
Many non-profit community hospitals developed directly from these almshouses, and as 
such retained the religious tradition of charity.  
 As the U.S. became wealthier its hospitals became more professionalized and 
grew by and large into municipal institutions. To date, 87% of U.S. registered hospitals 
are community (as opposed to federal) hospitals, 57% of which are nongovernmental and 
run not-for-profit.
6
 These hospitals can be further divided into religious or non-sectarian. 
Religious hospitals are operated and governed on a voluntary basis by religious groups 
and congregations, often with the mission of aiding the poor and needy. The Catholic 
Church, for instance, is the single largest non-profit health provider in the United States, 
with 620 hospitals accounting for 15.7% of outpatient visits annually.
7
 Religious hospitals 
are registered 501(c)3 tax exempt organizations and as such the IRS has a detailed and 
public record of their receipts and assets.
8
 In Alabama, for example, the Baptist Health 
System is the single largest public charity in the state by gross receipts, and third largest 
by total assets. In Mississippi, four of the top ten public charities are Baptist hospitals 
with combined assets broaching $1 billion. 
As University of Pennsylvania nursing science professor, Dr. Barbra Mann-Wall 
has written, rising healthcare costs in the 70’s put pressure on voluntary hospitals, as they 
were transformed by the nascent Medicaid and Medicare programs. Thus the 1980s 
                                                          
6
AHA (2014), “Fast Facts on US Hospitals.” American Hospital Association. Retrieved from: 
http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml   
7
Filteau, J. (2010), “Catholic hospitals serve one in six patients in the United States.” National Catholic 
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… witnessed the growth of for-profit hospital networks, resulting in increased 
vulnerability of smaller not-for-profit institutions. More than 600 community 
hospitals closed. It was at this time that both for-profit and not-for-profit 
institutions began forming larger hospital systems, which were significant changes 
in the voluntary hospital arena. A system was a corporate entity that owned or 
operated more than one hospital ... Cost containment was the theme of hospitals in 
the 1990s. The balance of power in these institutions shifted from caregivers to the 
organized purchasers of care, with Medicare and Medicaid becoming a huge 
governmental influence in all types of hospitals. At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, rising costs have forced many hospitals to close, including public 
hospitals that have traditionally served as safety nets for the nation’s poor. Some 
of the larger not-for-profit corporations have bailed out public facilities through 
lease arrangements, such as the one between the Daughters of Charity’s Seton 
Medical Center and the public Brackenridge Hospital in Austin, Texas, that 
occurred in 1995. These types of arrangements have had their own problems, 
however, such as the complications that arise when a large secular organization 
such as Brackenridge tries to join forces with a hospital whose policies are 
dictated by its religious affiliation. (Mann-Wall, 1998) 
How does this fit into the phenomenon of the “adherents shock”?  To find out, I used data 
from the American Hospital Association (AHA) of community hospital beds-per-
thousand people by state for the decades 1970-2010.  I ran multiple cross-sectional 
regressions of adherents on beds-per-thousand and consistently found a strong positive 




relationship. By pooling and using year dummies, one extra community hospital bed-per-
thousand was associated with 5.3 more adherents per hundred people.   
Table 4. Dependent Variable: Adherents; N=250, 50x5; OLS regression 
 
Coefficient Std. Err.* p-value 95% Conf. Interval 
Beds-per-thousand  5.3441 0.7949 0.000 3.7783 6.9098 
Year  7.189806 0.838719 0.000 5.5044 8.8753 
1980 -1.4164 2.1130 0.503 -5.5785 2.7457 
1990 5.8384 2.1946 0.008 1.5157 10.1611 
2000 15.2749 2.4729 0.000 10.4041 20.1459 
2010 5.2195 2.3624 0.028 0.5662 9.8728 
Constant 28.0814 3.8967 0.000 20.4058 35.7569 
R-squared = 0.258    *robust 
 
Thus one possible mechanism by which Medicaid and Medicare growth crowded out 
religious adherents is by displacing community hospitals. Many congregations may have 
been gaining adherents through affiliation with hospital systems. As for-profit hospitals 
grow in number to capture Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement dollars, non-profit 
religious hospitals either close or change ownership. As a result, the potential for 
religious recruitment via religious hospitals fades, and current members are able to access 
state subsidized healthcare through purely secular institutions. This interpretation is 
broadly consistent with the economics literature on U.S. hospital dynamics. For example, 
Brewster (2010) shows that for-profit hospitals out compete non-profits by raising 
Medicare reimbursements per enrollee. Nevertheless, as a robust theory it requires more 
concentrated empirical investigation beyond the scope of this thesis. 




III.c. General Social Surveys (GSS) 
 
The GSS has been conducted either annually or biannually by the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) since 1972. It contains a large number of indicators for 
representative samples of the U.S. Census divisions, including religious preference, 
church attendance, and degree of fundamentalism. Many controls are available, including 
race, age, gender and region, however the relatively small sample of between 1500-2000 
interviews a year becomes less reliable as more controls are imposed. This paper focuses 
on analysing the secular boom within groups of states and divisions over time, so samples 
will be controlled by census regions.  
 
By the GSS’s estimate, the secular boom begins in the early 1990, as shown by Figure 1 
and Figures i and ii in the appendix. In 1991, 63.7% of the United States identified as a 
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shares were roughly consistent with the preceding 18 years. Yet by 2010, the Protestant 
market share has declined to 47.7%, Catholics have held steady, and the Others and 
Nones have reached 7.9% and 16.5% respectively. The 2012 GSS survey now shows 
Nones at 18% nationwide.  
At first blush it seems like the Nones and Others have grown over the past two 
decades solely at the expense of Protestants, whose share declined 16 percentage points. 
This underscores a significant shortcoming with the GSS data. According to research by 
Pew, the American Catholic Church has suffered substantial losses in its traditional 
membership but are obscured in the aggregate mainly due to offsetting immigration from 
Latin America.
9
 In fact, Pew’s analysis, which otherwise accords with the GSS, finds that 
“Catholicism has lost more people to other religions or to no religion at all than any other 
single religious group” (Pew:19). Nonetheless, 44% of the contemporary Nones are 
former Protestants, compared to the 27% who are former Catholics, and 21% who are 
non-converts (Pew: 29). Due to these issues of internal demographic change I have 
elected to focus my analysis on the Nones, as it represent a convenient catch-all for all 
those who have left their faith or were raised without one.  
While younger age groups boast a higher share of Nones, Pew and GSS alike 
show the category has increased substantially across every age group. One feature that 
makes the younger cohort distinct, however, is the relatively higher share of atheists and 
agnostics. While 15% of 40-49 year olds are currently unaffiliated with any particular 
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religion, 12% still consider themselves religious or merely secular. The GSS data shows a 
similar phenomenon, with up to 44% of self-proclaimed Nones still believing that the 
bible is either the direct or inspired word of God.  
This is consistent with the commitment signalling view of religious organisation. 
Religions that have been crowded out by state social insurance would not immediately 
create a boom in atheism. Rather, the newly unaffiliated may be just as personally 
spiritual; they are simply no longer incentivized to maintain specific beliefs that function 
to identify with a particular religious collective, nor would they fear the same degree of 
stigma or forgone benefits for expressing potentially heretical views. Thus, the 
unaffiliated are nearly half as likely to say that it is very important to belong to a 
community of people who share values and beliefs, compared to the general public.
10
 
Indeed, for both former Protestants and Catholics, the main reasons given for leaving 
their childhood religion is differing religious or moral beliefs, followed by disagreements 
with particular institutions, practices and people (Pew, 2008).  
III.c.i Empirical Model using GSS data 
 
My empirical approach with the GSS data is similar to the approach used for the RCMS 
data. Only this time it is a fixed effects model with Nones as the dependent:   
Nonesit  =  β0 + β1Medical Variable it + ΣβkXk,it + αi + uit 
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The medical variable is either real Medicaid per-capita or federal health spending as a 
percent of state GDP, while X represents my set of controls. Medicaid per-capita is the 
appropriate metric, as opposed to per-enrollee, because it holds the population constant 
and thus captures changes in eligibility rates and benefit size. Federal health spending is 
similar to the RCMS medical benefit data in that it is mainly composed of Medicare and 
Medicaid payments. To align with the GSS I have had to convert my k controls to census 
divisions. This was done by averaging the variables, weighted by population. The 
reported results will consist of the variables summarized in Table 5: 
Table 5. Variable descriptions, for years 1970-2010 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Medicaid Per-Capita 81 646.67 448.84 88.81 1966.98 
State Heath Spending % of GDP 81 1.79 0.93 0.64 4.35 
ln(Median Income) 81 10.80 0.15 10.35 11.06 
Median Age 81 34.48 1.95 31.22 39.62 
Highschool Graduation Rate 81 73.77 5.21 63.10 85.69 
Poverty Rate 81 13.40 2.91 8.05 20.75 
Diversity 81 44.62 13.91 19.35 74.19 
  
The panel has nine 5 year periods, from 1970 to 2010, and is strongly balanced. However, 
the GSS was conducted annually from 1972 to 1994 with a few gap years, and then 
biannually thereafter. Since most of my controls are based on the decade and half decade, 
some of the data points are imputed using adjacent years. For example, the Nones set to 
1970 are actually from the GSS’s earliest measure from 1972. This adjustment is minor 
and is not expected to impact on the final results.  




For comparison purposes and to test the robustness of the results, I also ran the 
model as a pooled regression and as a panel with random effects. This is because fixed 
intercepts make less sense for census divisions, which are somewhat arbitrary collections 
of states, even though the Hausman test rejects random effects at the 0.05 level. The 
results are detailed in Table 6 and are surprisingly consistent with the RCMS results. 
With fixed effects, a $100 increase in per-capita Medicaid spending results in a 1.3 
percentage point increase in people claiming to have no religion. Similarly, a percentage 
point increase in federal health spending as a percentage of GDP lead to 3.5 percentage 
point increase in Nones. Together, the fixed effect models were able to explain 73-80% of 
the within group variation in non-religious rates. Table 7 shows how the results change 
dramatically if time effects are added. The Nones rose so forcefully after 1990 that the 
year dummies take all the credit. I believe this points to the significance of the policy 
changes that occurred around 1990 which led to a dramatic non-stationary increase in 
Medicaid eligibility, discussed in the next section.  These changes were determined at the 
Federal level prior to the secular boom, and thus remove some of the concern that rising 
federal health spending is endogenous to the non-religious rate. 




Table 6. Dependent Variable: None (GSS: Religious Preference)* 
N = 81 
9 groups, 9 observations per group: 













Medicaid Per-Capita 0.0084 0.0133 0.0095       
Robust standard errors 0.0022 0.0037 0.0031       
P-value 0.000 0.007 0.002       
State Health Spending % of GDP       3.4357 3.5504 3.4272 
        0.8989 0.839 0.8608 
        0.000 0.003 0.000 
ln(Median Income) 31.1184 15.2438 28.617 29.7809 23.1593 29.6266 
  7.6348 11.3767 11.655 7.6793 9.0126 8.5349 
  0.000 0.217 0.014 0.000 0.033 0.001 
Median Age -0.3877 -1.7405 -0.3738 -0.1493 -0.7902 -0.114 
  0.4402 1.0906 0.3111 0.4618 1.5066 0.6064 
  0.381 0.149 0.230 0.747 0.614 0.851 
Highschool Graduation Rate 0.0896 -0.4177 0.059 0.2045 -0.084 0.2033 
  0.1303 0.3123 0.1051 0.123 0.3087 0.1171 
  0.493 0.218 0.575 0.101 0.792 0.083 
Poverty Rate 0.828 0.5809 0.7278 0.6483 0.6505 0.6476 
  0.2971 0.308 0.4408 0.3069 0.4068 0.4068 
  0.007 0.096 0.099 0.038 0.148 0.111 
Diversity 0.0138 0.66 0.0224 0.0889 0.5976 0.0914 
  0.0544 0.4176 0.053 0.0508 0.5355 0.0613 
  0.801 0.153 0.673 0.084 0.297 0.136 
 




Table 6. Continued 
Constant -338.374 -111.59 -309.311 -342.276 -250.327 -341.821 
  79.5274 139.0417 120.1036 82.0844 115.9919 85.6434 
  0.000 0.445 0.010 0.000 0.063 0.000 








 Overall 0.7042 0.2245 0.7027 0.6998 0.2950 0.6997 









Table 7. Dependent Variable: None (GSS: Religious Preference) 
N = 81 
9 groups, 9 observations per group: 
1970-2010 at 5 year intervals 
Entity & Time  
Fixed Effects 
Medicaid Per-Capita -0.0077 
 




































1975 -6.6492 -3.4812 
1980 -9.4110 -5.1823 
1985 -12.8203 -7.6388 
1990 2.4591 4.7808 
1995 3.4555 9.1676 
2000 2.7245 8.2571 
2005 1.4357 9.5349 
2010 6.1912 16.3016 





R-Squared Within 0.8967 0.9039 
 
Between 0.0510 0.0356 
 
Overall 0.3563 0.4747 




III.c.ii Discussion of Results from GSS  
 
The early 1990s saw a massive increase in health spending on the poor, recorded as 
vendor payments at the Federal level. Two main changes – one in law and one in policy – 
combine to explain the phenomenon.  
First, Public Law 99-643, enacted in November 1986, made permanent a 
provision that allows current and former recipients of Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) disability payments to be eligible for Medicaid, and to move freely between the 
programs. Then in 1990, the Supreme Court ruled on the Sullivan v. Zebley, a case 
involving the determination of childhood disability benefits. The decisions main impact 
was to dramatically relax the Social Security Administrations definition of disability for 
children, resulting into a sudden increase in both SSI and Medicaid enrollment. This 
ruling was used as an instrument in Hungerman (2009) to demonstrate SSI’s effect in 
crowding out of charitable spending by Methodist churches. Around the same time, 
eligibility was expanded for low-income Medicare beneficiaries as well. 
Second, both the Medicaid and Medicare statues require that states make 
payments to so-called Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH). These are hospitals where 
a disproportionately large share of their services goes to of low income patients. The rule 
originated in the 1981 federal budget, conceived to soften the blow on safety-net hospitals 
in light of the states’ new ability to decouple Medicaid and Medicare payment rates. But 
states were slow to begin paying DSHs. Thus in 1986 law makers passed a budget that 




included provisions aimed at forcing states to make DSH payments. In 1989, these 
enticements backfired. As Spivey and Kellerman (2009) explain: 
Matters changed in 1989, when enterprising budget experts discovered that they 
could claim federal DSH funds without expending general state funds. The 
hospitals that were slated to receive DSH funds were asked (or, sometimes, 
directed) to contribute the required state share; the state would then use this 
money to draw down a large federal matching payment. The hospitals would get 
their contributions back and perhaps a bit more, but the states often kept the lion’s 
share of the federal payment. Some states even “recycled” a portion of their 
retained federal DSH funds and used it to draw down additional federal Medicaid 
dollars. With the DSH system effectively serving as a money pump that pulled 
federal funds into state coffers, the program experienced explosive growth. 
Between 1990 and 1996, federal DSH payments ballooned from $1.4 billion to 
more than $15 billion annually.  
This massive increase in federal spending on the poor and infirm at the state level 
precedes and then, as Figure 6 shows, closely tracks within group changes in the rates of 
non-religious. As the GSS results demonstrate, the correlation is robust to a logical set of 
controls across U.S. census divisions. 
Combining this result with the result from the RCMS analysis paints a compelling 
portrait of the U.S. secular boom as being the result of state and federal welfare 




expansions, especially to the extent that it distorted the voluntary hospital system. The 
boom has been felt in two principal ways.  
 
First, the initial rise in health spending in the early 1990s enabled the more moderate to 
liberal religious adherents to let go of their affiliation. This is the increase in Nones 
observed in GSS data. Analysis of other GSS controls such as political party affiliation 
show the Nones of the early 90s tended to have liberal leanings, but have moderated over 
time. Second, as time wore on, Medicaid and Medicare expansions interacted with the 
increasingly profit-oriented hospital sector, and many religious hospitals closed down or 
converted to secular ownership. Falling congregational membership followed suit.   
IV. Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The narrative constructed in the preceding paragraph is still, in its detail, speculative. 
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spending on public assistance medical benefits and the decline in U.S. church adherent 
rates, and the emergence of a growing non-religious population. For example, a $100 
increase in Medicaid spending is associated with a 1.3% percentage point rise in the non-
religious population within census divisions, using GSS data; and a $100 increase in per-
capita medical benefits (principally Medicare and Medicaid) is associated with a 1.2 
adherents per 100 loss within states, using RCMS data. I have conceptualized this effect 
using a model of religious groups as informal insurance providers, combined with what I 
know of the history of the U.S. religious hospital system. 
More concentrated and rigorous analysis of the secular boom is needed to verify 
these preliminary findings. In particular, research should focus on the many ways 
Medicaid and Medicare interact with the religious healthcare market. This is all the more 
important with the continuing roll-out of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which is 
expected to enroll 8.7 million new people into Medicaid in 2014 alone, with an additional 
8.8 million expected by 2016.
11
 The ACA does this by mandating new higher minimum 
thresholds for Medicaid eligibility, some for groups that were never eligible before. This 
includes many childless adults and both working and non-working parents. Since 24 
states will be allowed to opt out of the Medicaid expansion, it creates a nearly ideal 
natural experiment – 24 states in the control group, and 26 states plus D.C. in the 
treatment group – to further test the role of public health spending on the secular boom 
and adherents shock.  
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Additionally, the IRS record of religious non-profit hospitals could be an 
important resource for confirming my adherents shock hypothesis. Since RCMS data is 
built up from the county level, in principal a researcher could identify counties where 
religious hospitals have closed or been converted, and compare the local loss of adherents 
to similar counties that didn’t suffer closures. Finally, more theoretical and empirical 
attention should be paid to the model of religious organizations as providers of both 
formal and informal social insurance.  
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Figure i. Religious Change Within Census Divisions 
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Figure ii. Nones Within Census Divisions 
 
 
